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Recep Tayyip Erdoğan won Turkey’s presidential election on 10 August, becoming the first directly elected
President in the country’s history. Firat Cengiz writes that while Erdoğan’s ultimate aim is to
establish a presidential system in Turkey, his strategy rests on securing an increase in support for
his ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) at the 2015 parliamentary elections. She notes that
this could prove difficult because Erdoğan, as a formally neutral President, will no longer be able to
lead the AKP in the election.
On 11 August 2014 Turkey’s freshly elected 12 th President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan gave his fourth
‘balcony speech’ from the headquarters of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Ankara.
Erdoğan’s speeches have now become a post-election victory phenomenon in which the AKP leader attempts to
reassure Turkey’s increasingly marginalised opposition. Accordingly, in his fourth speech Erdoğan called on all of
Turkey’s political groups to kick-start a ‘social reconciliation process’.
Turkey’s increasingly polarised society has long needed such a process that is even more imminent in the shadow of
increasing security threats facing the region’s minorities. An economically and politically strong Turkey in which a
diversity of religious, cultural and ethnic groups peacefully co-exist would also provide security to those living beyond
its borders. As recent catastrophes have shown, Yezidis and Kurds of the region, who have suffered from the tyranny
and violence of different political and religious groups throughout history, are particularly in need of such security.
Nevertheless, Erdoğan’s past track record of keeping his promises does not bode well for the future of such a
‘reconciliation process’: the peace process with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) has all but failed for the second
time. Turkey’s marginalised opposition have faced extreme police brutality since the Gezi Park protests in the
summer of 2013 as well as at its first anniversary. Demands for equality for all minorities, including the Kurds,
Alaouites, women, LGBT and other cultural and religious minorities have been completely ignored in the context of
the recent constitutional reform process. The Soma mine disaster that claimed the lives of more than 300 miners has
not instigated a serious attempt to improve the increasingly dire conditions facing Turkey’s working class.
Erdoğan’s lack of credibility to start and manage a social reconciliation process is particularly disappointing, since he
is – as the country’s first directly elected president – more likely to succeed in such a process than before. Turkey’s
Constitution had foreseen the country’s president to be elected by Parliament, as is usual in parliamentary
democracies. Nevertheless, non-majoritarian institutions, including the military and the Constitutional Court,
interfered with the election process of Turkey’s 11 th President Abdullah Gül. In response, in a tactical move the
Parliament amended the Constitution to establish direct public elections starting from the election of the 12th
president.
Erdoğan has long desired to be Turkey’s first publicly elected president. The result of the 10 August elections has not
come as a surprise: Erdoğan won the elections in the first round by securing just under 51.8 per cent of the vote
against Eklemeddin Ihsanoğlu, the candidate of the central left-right coalition, and Selahattin Demirtaş, the candidate
of the Kurdish People’s Democratic Party, who received around 30.4 per cent and 9.8 per cent of the vote
respectively. The pre-election campaign process was extremely unexciting and uninspiring: this was partially due to
Erdoğan’s almost guaranteed victory and partially due to the central left-right coalition’s failure to identify a dynamic
reformist candidate.
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The result of the presidential elections are almost an identical repetition of those of the 2011 general elections and
the 2014 local elections: as shown in the Figure below, Demirtaş received the majority of votes in the Kurdish region
as well as the marginal votes in the metropolitan areas with an election campaign that spoke not only to Kurds but to
all marginalised groups including women, LGBT, working classes and other minorities. Ihsanoğlu received the
majority of votes in the country’s Aegean and Mediterranean cost-line. Erdoğan secured the majority of votes in all
other regions. In summary, the public did not perceive the country’s first presidential elections any differently than the
parliamentary and local elections.
Figure: Candidates which received the majority of votes in Turkish regions in the 2014 presidential election
Note: Figure compiled by Maurice Flesier based on the unofficial results of 11 August.
Reproduced for illustrative purposes under a creative commons licence (CC-BY-SA-4.0)
At first glance Erdoğan may seem to have entrenched his political power even more strongly after achieving this
new and long desired post. Nevertheless, his and his party’s near political future might turn out to be unexpectedly
tricky. Turkey’s Constitution still foresees an institutional regime based on the dynamics of a parliamentary
democracy. Thus, the President enjoys only symbolic powers and is expected to be officially politically neutral,
although practically the latter has seldom been the case so far.
Naturally, Erdoğan is not content with the miniscule powers currently invested in the presidency. Thus, in the current
constitutional reform process that was launched after the 2011 parliamentary elections Erdoğan and his party’s
primary aim has been to replace Turkey’s parliamentary democracy with a semi-presidential regime. Nevertheless,
AKP, despite its absolute majority in Parliament, still does not enjoy the supermajority necessary to amend the
Constitution singlehandedly. Thus, Erdoğan would like to see the AKP increase its vote in the forthcoming 2015
parliamentary elections.
However, Erdoğan will not be able to lead the AKP in the next parliamentary elections, as he must resign from his
position of the party leader, due to the politically neutral position of the President. He openly declared that he wishes
to see a powerful figure take over the party leadership and this is vital if the AKP is to preserve, let alone extend, its
parliamentary majority. Nevertheless, it remains to be seen if Erdoğan will be able to work closely with and
accommodate another powerful political figure.
Additionally, his resignation might result in a political fragmentation in the AKP: the previous President Abdullah Gül
implied that he is up for the task, but it is known that Erdoğan favours the current Foreign Affairs Minister Ahmet
Davutoğlu. Neither potential candidate comes close to Erdoğan in terms of their charisma and the support they enjoy
within AKP. Political life is very unpredictable – particularly so in Turkey, and an unlikely party leader might also
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emerge in the near future. Nevertheless, if the AKP’s electoral popularity suffers from the change in leadership,
Erdoğan might be locked in a marginalised powerless post for the foreseeable future. Thus, his insistence on
becoming the first directly elected President of Turkey might turn out to be a politically premature move.
Please read our comments policy before commenting .
Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy, nor
of the London School of Economics.
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